From sensing to emergent adaptations: Modelling the proximate architecture for decision-making  by Eliassen, Sigrunn et al.
F
a
S
a
b
a
A
A
K
C
E
I
A
H
1
t
r
d
c
t
l
t
d
(
i
h
0
0Ecological Modelling 326 (2016) 90–100
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Ecological  Modelling
j ourna l h omepa ge: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /eco lmodel
rom  sensing  to  emergent  adaptations:  Modelling  the  proximate
rchitecture  for  decision-making
igrunn  Eliassena,  Bjørn  Snorre  Andersena,  Christian  Jørgensenb, Jarl  Giskea,∗
Department of Biology and Hjort Centre for Marine Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Uni Research and Hjort Centre for Marine Ecosystem Dynamics, Bergen, Norway
 r  t  i  c  l e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
vailable online 14 September 2015
eywords:
ommunity ecology
volutionary ecology
ndividual-based ecology
rchitecture
euristics
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
During  the past  50 years,  evolutionary  theory  for  animal  behaviour  has  branched  into  different  method-
ological frameworks  focussing  on  age-,  state-,  density-,  and  frequency-dependent  processes.  These
approaches  have  led to valuable  insights  in  optimal  responses,  state  dependent  choices,  and  behavioural
strategies  in  social  contexts.  We  argue  that  time  is ripe  for  an  integration  of  these  methodologies  based  on
a  rigorous  implementation  of proximate  mechanisms.  We  describe  such  a  modelling  framework  that  is
based  on  the  architectural  structures  of  sensing  and  information  processing,  physiological  and  neurolog-
ical states,  and behavioural  control  in animals.  An  individual-based  model  of  this  decision  architecture  is
embedded in a genetic  algorithm  that  ﬁnds  evolutionary  adaptations.  This  proximate  architecture  frame-
work can  be  utilized  for modelling  behavioural  challenges  in  complex  environments,  for  example  how
animals  make  behavioural  decisions  based  on multiple  sources  of  information,  or adapt  to  changing  envi-
ronments.  The  framework  represents  the  evolution  of the  proximate  mechanisms  that  underlie  animal
decision  making,  and it aligns  with  individual-based  ecology  by emphasizing  the role  of local  information,
perception,  and individual  behaviour.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Most theories for animal behaviour have traditionally assumed
hat individuals have accurate perception of the current envi-
onment, that they have full information on which to base their
ecisions, and that they make optimal choices independent of time
onstraints or the amount of computation required. This is in con-
rast to observations of animal behaviour where one would most
ikely conclude that animals are not smart but quite often do clever
hings. This apparent cleverness may  stem from two sources at
ifferent time scales:
1) Animals are ﬂexible as they e.g. can respond fast and adequately
in situations they have never experienced before. This suggests
that behaviour is controlled by heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2004),
where the proximate mechanism (the decision-making pro-
cess) has an architecture that allows efﬁcient information use
and decision-making. This architecture enables minor changes
Abbreviations: GA, genetic algorithm; GOS, global organismic state; IBM,
ndividual-based model; NR, neuronal response.
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304-3800/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
in sensory input (e.g. stronger signals of predator presence) to
lead to very different behaviours (e.g. termination of feeding
behaviour) or experience from one situation to be made useful
in a novel context.
(2) Small evolutionary changes in this architecture may  alter the
behavioural phenotype quite substantially (e.g. van der Post
and Semmann, 2011a), very similar to how small mutations in
the regulation of developmental pathways can open up mor-
phological diversity and innovations (e.g. Moczek et al., 2011).
In the language of Tinbergen (1963), the proximate mechanism
has an architecture that is particularly good at evolving as the
ultimate drivers change.
As a result animal behaviour is controlled by proximate heuris-
tic mechanisms that rest upon an innovative architecture. Still, the
proximate mechanisms have largely been ignored in evolutionary
and ecological models despite that they are (i) what evolve, (ii) what
cause the emergence of behaviours one can observe in the wild
and in the lab, and (iii) what can be studied in terms of neurology,
physiology, biochemistry, and genetics. In this paper we describe
the proximate architecture for decision-making, which represents
biological processes from sensing via information processing and
decision making through to the physiological and behavioural
response. We  argue that this framework is useful for understanding
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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nimal behaviour and that the proximate architecture can be
ncorporated mechanistically within an individual-based approach.
ith proper rooting in evolutionary adaptation, this may  become
n important tool for evolutionary and ecological modelling.
. Behaviour in the individual-based paradigm
Evolutionary theory for animal behaviour has branched into
ifferent modelling frameworks focussing on age-, state-, density-
 and frequency-dependent processes, with little integration
etween methodologies. The American statistician Alfred Lotka
as the ﬁrst to model evolutionary adaptation and behaviour,
y turning the population growth equation of Euler (1760) into
n equation for ﬁtness (Lotka, 1907, 1925). In his interpreta-
ion of what we now call the Euler–Lotka equation, competing
esource investments and activities of the organism are evaluated
ith a common currency: their contributions to the organism’s
xpected rate of offspring production. The modelling paradigm
s therefore based on the premise that organisms make optimal
ecisions. This tradition has developed further into life history
heory (Fisher, 1930; Murdoch, 1966; Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992;
illiams, 1966), optimal foraging theory (Emlen, 1966; MacArthur
nd Pianka, 1966; Charnov, 1976), game theory (Fretwell and Lucas,
970; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), and adaptive dynamics
Dieckmann and Law, 1996; Geritz et al., 1998; Metz et al., 1992).
While the Euler–Lotka equation, game theory and adaptive
ynamics are population-based tools to understand individuals,
ptimal foraging theory and state-dependent life history theory
Mangel and Clark, 1986; McNamara and Houston, 1986) can
e used and understood from a purely individual perspective.
lthough these methods are excellent tools in evolutionary ecol-
gy, none of them are all-purpose. Optimization techniques excel
t ﬁnding the best possible solution to a problem without consid-
ring potential ﬁtness valleys which may  prevent the optimum
tself from being reached. State-dependent life history theory is
xcellent for ﬁnding optimal policies when they depend on some
physiological) state of the organism, but at the expense of policies
owards other individuals. The opposite is the case for the game
heory tradition.
In the 1970s a different tradition, based on Individual Based
odelling (IBM; DeAngelis and Grimm,  2014; Huston et al.,
988) arose. This paradigm merged perspectives from artiﬁcial
ife (Langton, 1986; von Neumann, 1966) and artiﬁcial intelligence
Newell and Simon, 1956) with another major tradition in math-
matical ecology, community ecology. The early papers of IBM
ocused on forest ecosystems (Botkin et al., 1972; Shugart and West,
977, 1980) and ﬁsh populations (DeAngelis et al., 1980). The new
ool was used to study population and ecosystem consequences
f rare phenomena, such as the death of a canopy-forming tree or
he survival of a larval ﬁsh through the earliest life stages. From this
eginning, the individual based approach has given more ﬂexibility
n modelling ecological interactions, by allowing detailed repre-
entations of individuals living in complex ecological landscapes
Grimm and Railsback, 2005; Stillman et al., 2015). This is impor-
ant because ﬂexible and diverse behavioural responses generally
bserved in nature are not found in simpliﬁed models (Evans et al.,
012, 2013; Fawcett et al., 2012, 2014; McNamara and Houston,
009). While ecology and evolution has been integrated in the arti-
cial life tradition (e.g. Byrski et al., 2015; de Boer and Hogeweg,
012; Paredis, 1995; Ray, 1994), the link to evolutionary dynamics
n individual-based models has often been absent (Grimm,  1999).In the following we will discuss some features of organisms
hat may  be taken advantage of when modelling evolutionarily
daptive behaviours. These enable the integration of the ulti-
ate perspective of optimization models with the proximateelling 326 (2016) 90–100 91
mechanisms important in ecological interactions. There are many
methods available for this, collectively termed multi-scale models
by Hogeweg (2007). We  will focus on the proximate architecture
framework, which gives a representation of biological processes
from sensing via information processing and decision making
through to action for a wide range of animals. The framework
can be utilized in ecological modelling, in particular for organisms
that make decisions based on multiple sources of information, in
complex, variable and even novel environments, where long-term
ﬁtness consequences of behavioural choices are unpredictable.
3. Behavioural control through the proximate architecture
framework
In this section we  describe some key elements in decision
making and behavioural control in animals. As we move from
the idealized environments typical for the Euler–Lotka models to
moderately variable or complex environments, ﬁnding optimal
responses to all possible situations would require highly advanced
(Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2011; McNamara and Houston, 2009)
and energetically expensive brains (Nilsson, 2000). Natural orga-
nisms instead rely on simpler heuristics to handle large amounts
and different types of information (Gigerenzer, 2004; LeDoux,
1998). These ‘rules of thumb’ have been selected to perform well
in a variety of situations, including those never encountered before
(Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005).
Behavioural control in animals is organized as heuristics embed-
ded within an architecture of other modules or functions of the
organism. The architecture can be described as a series of weakly
connected survival circuits (LeDoux, 2012) which link perceptions
to behaviour. Also referred to as “the emotion system”, it plays a
central role in animal decision making (Cabanac, 1979; Leknes and
Tracey, 2008; Mendl et al., 2009) through evaluation of perceptions
and selection of the instrumental behavioural and physiological
responses (de Waal, 2011; LeDoux, 2000, 2012; Panksepp, 2005).
However, this proximate architecture is not limited to those con-
cepts psychologists call emotions (Izard, 2010), as survival circuits
exist for all drives that impact attention and behaviour of the organ-
ism (LeDoux, 2012). We  emphasize that in using concepts often
associated with human feelings, particularly the word “emotion”
with reference to LeDoux’s work, we  do not imply any mental
awareness of these internal processes in animals.
The architectural structure described above can be imple-
mented in individual-based modelling (Fig. 1; Giske et al., 2013),
and in the following we will sketch the process of decision making
in this framework, leaving the more technical modelling aspects
for Appendix. We  use an example from ﬁsh behaviour to illustrate
the concepts, but this speciﬁc formulation is only one possible way
of outlining the proximate architecture (see e.g. Evers et al., 2014,
2015).
3.1. Biological mechanisms
Speciﬁc to the architectural approach is the level of detail of the
representation of the chain of events from immediate perceptions
to instrumental behaviour (Giske et al., 2013; LeDoux, 2012). First,
all perceptions (including signals from within the body) are evalu-
ated in the brain, where different competing needs are weighed
against each other to determine the most important task. Next,
the organism focuses on solving this task. LeDoux (2012) calls this
chain from perception to behaviour a survival circuit, and animals
can have several such survival circuits running in parallel. These
may  for instance be related to hunger, thirst, sleepiness, curios-
ity, and fear; thus we may  say the survival circuits are bundled,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Each circuit has different modules; hunger
92 S. Eliassen et al. / Ecological Modelling 326 (2016) 90–100
Fig. 1. A generalized framework for behavioural control through the proximate architecture of decision-making. The brain can hold several neurobiological states simul-
taneously (here exempliﬁed with hunger and fear). The strength of these states depends on the combined neurological responses from one or more stimuli (internal, e.g.
stomach fullness, or external, e.g. behaviour of conspeciﬁcs). Each neuronal response function is determined by genetically inherited traits, which gives the potential for
different relationships between stimuli input and response strength between individuals (see Eq. (1) in Appendix and examples in Fig. 2). Inherited traits will also open for
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s  hungry or frightened. When in one of these states, the attention of the organism 
ay  for example be evoked by seeing food, seeing others eat, or by
hysiological needs of the organism. The survival circuit must be
nderstood over several time scales, with the shortest one being the
tate-dependent response to sensory information, at intermediate
cales it includes learning and memory (not included in Fig. 1), and
he longest time scale involves genetic adaptation of the gene pool.
s such, it belongs to the wider class of multi-scale phenomena
Hogeweg, 2007; van der Post and Semmann, 2011b; van der Post
t al., 2015).
.2. Appraisal phase
The ﬁrst phase, of retrieving and comparing information, is
alled the appraisal phase (LeDoux, 2012). For each survival cir-
uit, each of several sensory inputs evokes a neuronal response in
he brain (see Eq. (1) in Appendix). The weight of a given response
ay  depend on modulatory mechanisms (not shown in Fig. 1),
or example short-term effects of memory, long-lasting effects of
earning, and hormones more active in some life stages of the
rganism. There may  also be life-long effects of inherited metabolic
ropensities, for instance linking metabolic rate, food demand, and
ggression, or metabolic rate and risk willingness (Houston, 2010;
eale et al., 2010), or due to manipulation by parasites (Barber and
ingemanse, 2010; Barber et al., 2000).
The sum of all the neuronal responses in a given survival cir-
uit determines the strength of the neurobiological state in the
rain, for instance hunger, thirst, sleepiness, curiosity, or fear. The responses may  further be modulated by processes and states (not shown), such as
cal state determines the global organismic state, in this case whether the organism
ssed on making the best available physiological and behavioural response.
neurobiological states may  compete in a winner-takes-all fashion
where the strongest determines the current psychological state of
the organism, which is called the global organismic state (GOS,
LeDoux, 2012). The GOS is a state of the whole organism, not
only the brain, and it may  have neurological, physiological, and
behavioural manifestations. The model outlined in Fig. 1 only con-
siders two  states; ‘hunger’ and ‘fear’ (see Evers et al. (2014, 2015) for
a similar model with ‘fear’ and ‘like’ in primates). While it is math-
ematically straightforward to expand the model to include more
neurobiological states, the beneﬁt of a more realistic representation
needs to be traded against increased model complexity.
3.3. Response phase
The determination of the GOS is the start of the second half of
Fig. 1, called the response phase (LeDoux, 2012). Here, the organism
will have a physiological and a behavioural response, both aimed
at removing or reducing the cause of the GOS. If thirsty, the animal
will seek water, if hungry it will look for food. In this process, atten-
tion restriction is an important part of the physiological response,
where the animal pays more attention to information relevant to
its GOS and less, or none, to other cues (Dukas and Kamil, 2000;
Lima and Bednekoff, 1999; Miller et al., 2012; Purser and Radford,
2011; Tombu et al., 2011).
Although mutually exclusive behaviours, such as vigilance
and feeding, has been modelled using classical optimization
approaches (e.g. Houston et al., 1993; McNamara and Houston,
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992), the existence of a GOS, attention restriction, and narrow-
ng of behavioural options, represent a major change of perspective
ntroduced by the proximate architecture framework. The cost of
ttention restriction is lower sensitivity to other stimuli: fright-
ned ﬁsh may  for instance have lower efﬁciency in catching food
Purser and Radford, 2011). So how realistic is it? First, from an
daptationist perspective, there is no beneﬁt in having a range of
lternative global organismic states if the organism can execute
ts full behavioural repertoire from within any of them. The most
ikely purpose of being sexually aroused or of being frightened is to
arrow the focus of attention to solve a task that is important for
tness. Secondly, the attention restriction mechanism exists even
n sophisticated human brains (Tombu et al., 2011), but this does
ot mean that organisms cannot experience aspects of several GOS
imultaneously. In some situations different GOS are not in opposi-
ion, but rather complementary. An example is the combination of
like’ and ‘fear’ social attitudes towards other members of a primate
roup (Evers et al., 2014, 2015).
The model outlined in Fig. 1 does not grade the strength of
he GOS, while animals do. Whether an animal is terriﬁed or only
lerted will likely impact how long it may  take to consider other
eurobiological states (through memory, which is not yet included
n Fig. 1), and also whether it can consider more than one neurobi-
logical state at a time. A stickleback can dynamically balance its
unger drive and its perceived predation risk (Heller and Milinski,
979; Milinski and Heller, 1978) through a gradual regulation of
ts attention towards prey and predators (Milinski, 1985). Also, if
ll neurobiological states are weak, it may  be adaptive for the ani-
al  not to focus its attention. This has been termed ‘routinized
ehaviour’ by Guilford and Dawkins (1987), and can technically be
een as yet another GOS.
.4. Behavioural patterns
Giske et al. (2013) modelled spatial behaviour of an open-
cean midwater ﬁsh using the proximate architecture framework.
he overall model output described a ﬁsh population perform-
ng diel vertical migration, residing in shallow waters at night
nd migrating to deeper waters during daytime (Clark and Levy,
988; Hugie and Dill, 1994; Werner and Gilliam, 1984), as observed
n pelagic planktivores (Balino and Aksnes, 1993; Goodson et al.,
995; Kaartvedt et al., 2008; Torgersen et al., 1997) and modelled
Rosland and Giske, 1997; Staby et al., 2013). All models predict a
imilar behavioural patterns (diel vertical migration with some ver-
ical extension of the migrating layer), which shows that assuming
ome instantaneous trade-off as in optimization and game models
r assuming attention restriction and sequential focussing on the
ost urgent task may  result in the same overall space use patterns
f populations.
The similarity in movement patterns is mainly due of the
trong structuring force of light in aquatic environments. Light
ecays rapidly with water depth and impacts detection distances
f predators as well as the ﬁsh’s own encounter rate with prey
Aksnes and Utne, 1997). Modelling vertical distribution either as a
ensity-dependent game through ideal free distribution (Fretwell
nd Lucas, 1970) by ignoring the physiological state of individuals
Giske et al., 1997) or as a state-dependent life history optimiza-
ion (Mangel and Clark, 1986; McNamara and Houston, 1986) by
gnoring competition in a physiology-driven optimization model
Fiksen and Giske, 1995) resulted in the same overall picture. The
roximate architecture framework can on one hand be used to
valuate the importance of each factor, but it also allows for even
ore detailed descriptions of organisms and environments. As we
ill discuss in the following, one of the main differences between
lassical optimization and game theory models and the proximateelling 326 (2016) 90–100 93
architecture framework is that coexisting behavioural types with
dissimilar preferences and space use can emerged in the latter.
3.5. Consistent behavioural types
Incorporating proximate costs and constraints are essential for
studies of animal personalities (Bell, 2007; Biro and Stamps, 2008;
Budaev, 1997; Dingemanse and Reale, 2005; Dingemanse and Wolf,
2013; Sih et al., 2004; van Oers et al., 2005). The growing interest
in animal personalities arose from observations of consistencies
in individual physiology and behaviour over time (Gosling, 2001;
Houston, 2010; McCrae et al., 2000), but the mechanisms underly-
ing these behavioural differences are generally unknown (Fawcett
et al., 2014, 2015). Individuals in a proximate architecture frame-
work are less ﬂexible than ‘optimal’ individuals. They are restricted
by local information and the architecture of their heuristics (in this
case their individual neuronal response functions, see Appendix)
and do not behave according to unconstrained calculations of
detailed optimal policies. The populations modelled by Giske et al.
(2013) evolved to maintain two  or more variants of some neuronal
response functions, i.e. individuals showed variation in ‘personal-
ity’ with a strong genetic basis. In particular, consistent individual
differences emerged along the social/solitary-dimension, predom-
inantly when hungry. In the neuronal response function this was
related to how the presence of competitors was evaluated during
feeding, some individuals had alleles coding for weak discomfort,
while others had neuronal responses that gave strong discomfort
when many competitors were present (Fig. 2). Individuals with
strong discomfort would more often be found in low densities in
the outskirts of the vertically migrating population, while individ-
uals who  tolerated competitors were usually found at high densities
near the peak food concentration (Fig. 2). Thus, in the architectural
model, the emergence of persistent behavioural types led to a wider
space use of the ﬁsh populations. Coexistence of behavioural types
has also been observed in evolutionary models without represen-
tation of proximate architecture, e.g. Eliassen et al. (2006) and van
der Post et al. (2015).
The classical textbook explanations for diversity within popu-
lations are negative frequency-dependent selection (Ayala and
Campbell, 1974; Fisher, 1930) and gene-environment interactions
(Lewis, 1954) in spatially or temporally variable environments.
However, an explicit representation of the behavioural architecture
is in itself sufﬁcient to generate and maintain phenotypic variation
(Giske et al., 2014). The ultimate reason is that random mutations
in the genes underlying the architecture of the heuristics are a
source of internal variation among individuals, with the same prin-
cipal effects as external environmental variation for differences in
behaviours and phenotypes.
4. Evolving solutions: the genetic algorithm (GA)
Integrating ecological and behavioural aspects of the model with
evolutionary dynamics is not a trivial task. An individual-based
model embedded in a genetic algorithm is one way  of studying
complex, near-realistic ecological problems for which pure game
or optimization techniques are not well suited. The GA is a pow-
erful algorithm that needs to be used with care and consideration,
and the method represents a shift in focus from the equilibrium
solutions to evolutionary change in varying ﬁtness landscapes.
A variety of methodologies can be used to model behaviour in
individuals. If we  assume that organisms do not interact, then no
feedbacks are involved and optimization techniques can be used
to identify the ﬁtness peak (Clark and Mangel, 2000; Houston
and McNamara, 1999). In most cases, however, the behavioural
decisions of individuals have consequences for others, and the
94 S. Eliassen et al. / Ecological Modelling 326 (2016) 90–100
Fig. 2. Personality arising from the proximate architecture framework. A population consists of two  groups of ﬁsh (left) which differ signiﬁcantly in one gene determining
the  neuronal response towards competitors when hungry (see Fig. 1). The blue type (centre) has evolved allele values (y = 0.1–0.5, see Eq. (1) in Appendix) that give
strong  discomfort even at low competitor densities, while the red ﬁsh (right, y = 9.7–10.0) more or less ignore competitors and seek the depth with the highest initial food
c d ﬁsh,
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edrawn from Giske et al. (2013).
ay others behave will in turn inﬂuence the outcome of a
ehavioural decision. With such frequency-dependent feedback,
e can use game theoretic approaches or hill-climbing algorithms
uch as adaptive dynamics that utilize local selection gradients to
mprove strategies until they reach an evolutionarily stable strat-
gy (Dieckmann and Law, 1996; Metz et al., 1992). These methods
ork best when one or a few trait values characterize the strat-
gy of each individual. A more detailed description of the organism
equires several to many parameters, which allow behaviours to
epend on social context and feedbacks from multidimensional
nvironments. In such cases one is often left with individual-based
imulation models as the only feasible option.
IBMs are based on one of the most signiﬁcant biological
tructures: the organism. The most signiﬁcant evolutionary char-
cteristics of an organism are its existence and number of offspring.
hese bookkeeping traits were already used by Euler (1760) to
xplain differences in the population growth of nations. The
trength of the IBM approach is to expand the description of indi-
idual traits to include changes through an organism’s lifetime and
ariation among individuals. While the pedigree of IBM models
radually has expanded into a wide bush (Grimm and Railsback,
005), we concentrate on IBM as a tool to study populations of high
patial and temporal resolution. An IBM allows each organism to be
raced in space and time, which simpliﬁes and improves the repre-
entation of interactions among individuals (Grimm and Railsback,
005; Stillman et al., 2015), and it provides a link to phenomena and
tructures in the physical landscape. Hence, the strong restrictions
n descriptions of organisms in game theory and of competitors
r environmental change in state-dependent life history theory
Houston and McNamara, 1999; Railsback and Harvey, 2013) are
uch relaxed in IBMs (DeAngelis and Mooij, 2003, 2005). How-
ver, a link to evolutionary adaptation is not ensured by the
BM alone. For this, a mechanism for heritability of traits must
e added.
.1. The gene pool
Although “individual” by name, IBMs are tools for the study of
opulations (Grimm and Railsback, 2005). Even if the individual is
he focus of a study, the gene pool of the population is the continu-
usly evolving entity from which the individual gets its properties.
hen John Holland understood the adaptive force of natural selec-
ion on the gene pool, he invented the genetic algorithm (GA)
s an evolutionarily mathematical equation solver for complex at the outskirts of the vertically migrating population.
problems (Holland, 1975). The central idea of Holland’s GA was that
the solution to a problem could be found by iteration of competi-
tion experiments. For each new generation of experiments, those
with the lowest quality were discarded while the remaining could
be slightly modiﬁed before the next round. In the context of a bio-
logical IBM, this means that some parameter values of organisms
are coded as genes, where individuals that fail to reproduce do not
pass their genes on to the next generation. For those that do, muta-
tions may  alter the genes while sexual reproduction mixes genes
into new combinations in future organisms.
Thus, while the GA is one among many mathematical hill climb-
ing techniques, it is unique in its ability to mimic evolutionary
processes in complex environments. It is therefore a natural exten-
sion of the IBM approach (Fiksen, 2000; Hamblin, 2013; Higginson
et al., 2015; Huse and Giske, 1998; Ruxton and Beauchamp, 2008;
Wood and Ackland, 2007). Where the Euler–Lotka equation is
an analytical solution to an implicitly evolving population (Lotka,
1925), the GA numerically simulates a gradual approach towards
the solution, similar to an explicitly evolving population. Com-
bining IBM and GA simply means to run the IBM over many
generations, passing genes of the survivors on to their offspring.
In addition, the GA has the capacity to utilize all the environmental
and organismic diversity that an IBM can offer. The combined IBM
and GA models may  include processes central in life history theory,
game theory, and community ecology. While the ecological toolbox
contains well-established methods for studying organismal, social
or environmental complexity, the situation is different when two or
more of these complexity dimensions need to be considered simul-
taneously. The fact that evolving IBMs are not restricted to stable
environments over generations, stable population sizes, and popu-
lations of identical individuals, shows how versatile they are for
studying natural populations. In addition, strategies or behavioural
rules need not be speciﬁed in advance but can emerge as a result
of different physiological or behavioural trade-offs or life-history
constraints in various environments (Burtsev and Turchin, 2006;
Fiksen, 2000).
4.2. Genetic architecture
In the GA central traits are coded as genes and inherited by off-
spring of the surviving and reproducing parent (Hamblin, 2013;
Sumida et al., 1990). There are, however, limitations in the genetic
structure made in most models, as our understanding of physio-
logical and developmental processes is still insufﬁcient to create
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enotype-to-phenotype maps. Broadly there are three approaches:
o model genes and alleles explicitly as done by population genet-
cs (Otto and Day, 2007), to use quantitative genetics which can
ncorporate experimentally observed variance and co-variances
etween phenotypic traits (Dunlop et al., 2009; Lande, 1976; Lynch
nd Walsh, 1998), or to assume a more loose link between inher-
ted entity and its phenotypic effects but then losing the ability
o make predictions about actual rates of evolution. One ﬂexible
nd common approach is to assume that genomes are haploid,
nd that reproduction is asexual or a recombination of the haploid
enomes of two individuals (Hamblin, 2013). For a given ecological
cenario, the solution found using a GA may  therefore depend on
ow reproduction, recombination, and mutation are implemented
n the model (Hamblin, 2013; Ruxton and Beauchamp, 2008).
When genes are inherited independently of each other and mate
hoice is random, any allele on any gene may  be paired with very
ifferent alleles of other genes in the next generations. As a con-
equence, alleles that are able to persist across generations (in
he GA) are those that can successfully associate with most other
lleles in the gene pool and still form viable offspring (Dawkins,
976). While this may  be ﬁne in ecological landscapes with one
ingle peak, adaptation of the gene pool to multi-peaked land-
capes may  require coevolution of speciﬁc alleles of several genes.
his is most easily facilitated by co-location on the same chro-
osome so that the alleles are inherited together, or even in the
ame region of a chromosome to prevent separation in the offspring
hrough recombination. Natural organisms commonly have a non-
andom arrangement of genes on their chromosomes, suppression
f recombination outside hot-spots (Myers et al., 2005), and a non-
andom mating pattern. If the genome consists of more than a few
enes, the modeller would need to consider which genes should
e linked through inheritance, and which traits are preferred in
ate choice. We  illustrate this by the Giske et al. (2013) model
f ﬁsh behaviour, where the behavioural decisions are explained
n Fig. 1. It is not intuitive how 18 genes of 9 neuronal response
unctions, 4 modulatory genes and one gene for sex determina-
ion should be arranged on one or several chromosomes (Fig. 3).
he chromosomal arrangement of Giske et al. (2013) was  that the
wo parameters describing a neuronal response made up one chro-
osome which was never altered by recombination. Hence, only
utation could change the shape of a neuronal response function.
pproximately half the neuronal response chromosomes of an off-
pring was inherited from each parent, which means that complex
raits involving the coevolution of several neuronal response func-
ions could not evolve as stable entities. Similarly, the modulator
enes and the sex determination gene constituted one chromosome
nherited without internal recombination. This means that modula-
ion may  become sex-speciﬁc, and that any sex-speciﬁc behaviour
ad to be rooted in these modulatory genes. Alternative conﬁgu-
ations would be to arrange genes related to hunger or fear on the
ame chromosome, or all genes in the appraisal phase (Fig. 1) into
ne and those in the response phase into another. Such alternative
enetic architectures would through avoidance of recombination
ithin a chromosome allow coevolution of alleles and may  thereby
mpact the number of behavioural types or animal personalities
Bell and Sih, 2007; Dingemanse et al., 2010) which could coexist
n a population.
.3. Sensitivity analysis
The proximate architecture framework yields an element of
egeneracy (many-to-one-mapping, Wainwright et al., 2005) for
he evolving gene pool and for personality traits (Giske et al., 2014):
ne can think of Fig. 1 as a roadmap, where individuals as well as
opulations differ in which routes are highways. For example, an
rganism may  be hungry because its stomach is not full or becauseelling 326 (2016) 90–100 95
its appetite increases when seeing food. Hunger may also become
the GOS if the organism does not sense any predators nearby, or can
hide among conspeciﬁcs. This opens for several routes to states and
behaviours, for many different personality types within a popula-
tion, and for many differently evolved populations towards similar
environments (Giske et al., 2014). Such degeneracy is also seen
in artiﬁcial neural network models (Duarte et al., 2011; Enquist
and Arak, 1994; Huse and Giske, 1998), in cellular innovations
(Wagner, 2011) in developmental processes of animals (Doyle and
Csete, 2011; Draghi and Whitlock, 2012; Kirschner and Gerhart,
2005), and even in the translation of the genetic code to amino
acids and proteins. As degeneracy is natural in biological systems
(Wainwright et al., 2005), a part of the sensitivity analysis should
be to characterize it and study how it affects the evolution of the
population and the behavioural responses through standardized
virtual experiments. Here similar response patterns could result
from different pathways, and lead to comparable life history traits,
space use, or personality. Even with desktop computers and user-
friendly programming software (e.g. NetLogo, Railsback et al., 2006;
Sklar, 2007) we  can use these techniques to train our intuition about
effects of changing environments and produce interesting predic-
tions that could be tested on natural populations (Evers et al., 2014,
2015).
As an illustration of the type of sensitivity analysis performed
on models with explicit architecture, we  have tested the effect of
altering the arrangements of the 23 genes in the Giske et al. (2013)
model (Fig. 3). While one can construct plausible biological argu-
ments for all six chromosomal architectures, there is as far as we
know no good a priori way  to determine a preference for one over
the others. The best result, measured by the population egg pro-
duction which is the product of female survivorship and fecundity,
was obtained by the fully adaptive chromosome structure (number
5). Three of these six chromosomal arrangements are approxi-
mately equal with respect to offspring production. Hence, there
are likely many almost equally good ways of arranging genes on
chromosomes. In two arrangements, egg production was consider-
ably lower (Fig. 3), which calls for some initial caution and a need to
experiment with chromosome structure. Other challenges that are
not considered here may  select for different chromosomal arrange-
ments or there might be general chromosome structures that are
proﬁtable under a range of environmental conditions. Rather than
predeﬁning different architectural conﬁgurations, one could also
let the chromosomal structure evolve (e.g. Crombach and Hogeweg,
2007, 2008), which would alleviate the problem of predeﬁning and
choosing a genetic structure.
4.4. Environmental variation and over-ﬁtting
Whatever method used to investigate the effect of chromo-
somal structure, there is a risk of over-ﬁtting the solution (Tetko
et al., 1995), so that the evolved genetic structure excels in the cur-
rent scenario but is too speciﬁc to tackle other realistic scenarios.
Related to this issue is the problem of deciding the number of gener-
ations to run in the GA. There is always a chance that an improved
solution will be found after more generations, but this will also
increase the risk of over-ﬁtting. Environmental stochasticity, for
instance in the form of intergenerational ‘climate variation’, may
prevent or reduce the risk of over-ﬁtting (Giske et al., 2013). To facil-
itate comparisons between populations, the evolved gene pools
could be simulated in a standard environment every n generations,
or the behavioural responses of the ﬁnal population determined in
standardized tests.Running the model for only a few generations may, on the other
hand, leave insufﬁcient time for the GA to locate peaks in the
ﬁtness landscape. We  commonly observe a steep increase in ﬁt-
ness over the ﬁrst few generations in the GA,  particularly if the
96 S. Eliassen et al. / Ecological Modelling 326 (2016) 90–100
Fig. 3. Sensitivity to chromosomal arrangement. (A) Arrangements of genes coding for neuronal responses, modulation and sex on 6 different chromosome structures. The
F,  S, P, L and C labels on chromosomes are for genes related to neuronal responses to food, stomach fullness, predation, light and conspeciﬁcs, respectively. (1) The Giske et al.
(2013)  chromosomal architecture: one chromosome for each of 9 neuronal response (NR) functions and one for gender and modulation, in total 10 chromosomes. (2) One
chromosome for gender and modulation, one for all NRs related to fear, and one for all NRs related to hunger, in total 3 chromosomes. (3) As (2), but separate chromosomes
for  fear and hunger in appraisal and response phases of Fig. 1, in total 5 chromosomes. (4) One chromosome for gender and modulation, one for all NRs related to food,
conspeciﬁcs and light, respectively, and separate chromosomes for the two  NRs related to predators and stomach fullness, in total 6 chromosomes. (5) Three equally large
adaptive chromosomes, where each gene can mutate position. Offspring will inherit the chromosome structure of its same-sex parent, and the probability of inheritance of
all  (or none) genes on the chromosome from same-sex parent is 100%, 75%, and 50% on chromosomes 1–3, respectively). (6) As (5), but where both genes in one NR must be
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wn  the same chromosome. (B) The egg production in ﬁsh populations (from the Gisk
ith  10,000 ﬁsh larvae and run for 30,000 generations, with substantial stochastic
ean egg production and 95% conﬁdence interval among 10 replicate simulations b
opulation is seeded with random allele values. In the ﬁsh model
f Giske et al. (2013, 2014), population egg production levelled off
fter around 1000 generations, and Andersen (2014) did not ﬁnd
uality improvements in the model output after 1000 generations.
s there is always an inherent uncertainty in evolutionary mod-
lling whether the algorithm has arrived at or near a ﬁtness peak,
e recommend running multiple populations with some very long. (2013) model) with these chromosomal arrangements. Each simulation is initiated
onmental variation at short-term and generational time scales. The bars show the
en generation 20,000 and 30,000.
simulations to determine a reasonable number of generations. The
adaptation period depends on the goal of the modelling, as the time
to adapt a trait depends on the ﬁtness costs of suboptimal solu-
tions (Fisher, 1930). Life history, growth, or space use patterns in
the Giske et al. (2013) model generally converge early in simula-
tions whereas genetics or personality-related traits, takes longer to
stabilize.
l Mod
4
c
s
t
G
l
ﬁ
f
o
r
r
e
d
t
r
i
o
r
t
t
ﬁ
I
c
4
a
m
i
f
i
e
m
d
A
i
l
S
o
t
s
u
m
d
a
t
5
e
t
H
t
o
W
o
p
H
a
2
aS. Eliassen et al. / Ecologica
.5. Effects of implicit assumptions
The reproduction scheme will inﬂuence the evolutionary pro-
ess as well as the output of the model. Mate choice is important in
exually reproducing organisms, and different rules for mate selec-
ion may  be implemented in ecological modelling. For instance,
iske et al. (2013) allowed females to choose a mate among males
ocated at the same depth. Females mated with the largest of the
rst three males encountered and this resulted in sexual selection
avouring faster growth and more risk-prone behaviour in males. In
ther modelling scenarios, females had no mate preference which
esulted in smaller males that were rewarded for higher survival
ather than faster growth (Giske et al., 2014). As illustrated by this
xample, it is quite likely that patterns predicted by a model may
epend on factors not considered by the modeller or presented to
he reader. This problem is not speciﬁc to GA, but because the algo-
ithm is designed to solve complex problems, a side effect is that
s also ﬁnds and exploits weaknesses in such assumptions. At the
ther end of the model complexity spectrum, organisms are rep-
esented by simple processes and few variables. When comparing
he predictions of these models to natural systems, the processes
hat are not considered in the model need to be represented by
xed parameters or the few processes that are explicitly modelled.
n practice, this implies that many of the degrees of freedom in a
omplex model are hardwired in a simpler one.
.6. “Handle with care”
While our methodology is one step nearer the behavioural
rchitecture of natural organisms, it may  also be computationally
ore intensive and require attention to technical details. Think-
ng in terms of architecture of behavioural control will be useful
or a wide range of theoretical, experimental and ﬁeld studies, but
mportant insights can also be obtained through individual-based
volutionary simulations without being explicit about the proxi-
ate architecture (e.g. Higginson et al., 2015; Hogeweg, 2007; van
er Post and Semmann, 2011b; van der Post et al., 2015; Wood and
ckland, 2007). Using GA to simulate behavioural responses may
nvoke costs and beneﬁts which yield a surplus only when ana-
ytical methods are insufﬁcient (Ruxton and Beauchamp, 2008).
uch situations are when environmental variation is important,
r when behaviour is simultaneously impacted by a range of fac-
ors which makes pure optimization or pure game approaches too
implistic. However, it is hard to anticipate what is lost when
sing simpler models. As discussed above, a model of vertical
igration with explicit architecture was not only able to combine
ensity-dependent and state-dependent trade-offs, it also revealed
 potential for vertical structuring based on consistent behavioural
ypes.
. Individual-based ecology: building on the gene pool
The Alfred Lotka tradition in evolutionary ecology has led to
legant analytical and numerical ﬁndings through life history
heory (Fisher, 1930; Mangel and Clark, 1986; McNamara and
ouston, 1986; Murdoch, 1966; Williams, 1966), optimal foraging
heory (Emlen, 1966; MacArthur and Pianka, 1966), and game the-
ry (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973).
hile there are many reasons for continuing the development
f these methods, it is not straight-forward to combine them in
opulation models (Houston and McNamara, 1999; Railsback and
arvey, 2013). While Individual-based Neural network genetic
lgorithms (Huse and Giske, 1998), hedonic modelling (Giske et al.,
003), and eco-genetic IBMs (Dunlop et al., 2009) can integrate
cross age-, state-, and density-dependent processes, and solve theelling 326 (2016) 90–100 97
computational challenge, the proximate architecture framework
described in this paper is based on mechanisms of decision making
found in a wide range of natural organisms (Cabanac, 1979; Macnab
and Koshland, 1972; Mendl et al., 2009; Stock et al., 1989) and it
can also be implemented in models.
Models that consider the effect of individual variation and evolv-
ing gene pools lead to two important insights that differ from
predictions based on traditional optimality models. First, as orga-
nisms need to solve immediate problems and respond to the
current and local environmental conditions, their responses may
not be optimal in the classical sense. Strategies that are robust and
perform well under a variety of situations are often more beneﬁcial
in the long run (Yoshimura and Clark, 1991; Yoshimura and Jansen,
1996) and inter-dependencies between behaviour, physiology or
life-history traits may  allow for several coexisting solutions to sim-
ilar problems (Mangel and Stamps, 2001; Stamps, 2007). Next, at
the population level there is a similar analogy, as the diversity in the
evolved gene pool has evolved for being resilient to changing condi-
tions and the coarser contours of the ﬁtness landscape. The adaptive
diversiﬁcation within the gene pool or between populations is facil-
itated by the proximate architecture for decision-making, which
allows many different but equally valuable pathways from sensing
through to behaviour (Giske et al., 2014).
Human impact on the planet makes it increasingly important to
understand complex problems and interactions on multiple scales.
Community ecology is the sum of social interactions and local
environmental effects on single individuals, which again are conse-
quences of adapted and often coevolving gene pools. The proximate
architecture framework is not only a useful tool for ﬁnding adaptive
behaviour in complex situations, but also a better representation
of the behavioural responses and the underlying genetic architec-
ture typical for natural populations. As a modelling framework it
may  also bridge the individual focus of behavioural ecology with
the population focus in many other ecological disciplines.
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Appendix. Examples and functions
Giske et al. (2013, 2014) modelled spatial behaviour in an IBM
of a ﬁsh population using the proximate architecture framework
(Fig. 1), and a GA to evolve adaptive values of genes. All perceptions
P were scaled linearly relative to the strongest observation of each
perception, and the neuronal response R to each perception P was
modelled as a sigmoidal function (Brown and Holmes, 2001)
R = (P/y)
x
1 + (P/y)x (1)
where x and y are genes with allele values in the 0.1–10.0 range,
which give responses 0 ≤ R ≤ 1. The allele of the y-gene determines
the perception P at which the response R = 0.5, and the x gene deter-
mines how rapidly the response increases with P. Depending on the
values of x and y, the shape of the function may  range from near
linear to a threshold-type response within this parameter range
(0 ≤ P ≤ 1). This allows for graded responses to weak signals as well
as saturation of information (Aksnes and Utne, 1997; Ashley et al.,
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007). A clear beneﬁt of this approach relative to that of artiﬁcial
eural networks is that the function in Eq. (1) has a clear biological
nterpretation as it displays how the organism evaluates a single
erception.
We have tested whether this function is ﬂexible enough by
llowing the individuals to use a neuronal response function with
hree additive elements (and six genes):
 = (P/y1)
x1
1 + (P/y1)x1
+ (P/y2)
x2
1 + (P/y2)x2
+ (P/y3)
x3
1 + (P/y3)x3
(2)
e found that for the ecological scenario of Giske et al. (2013), deci-
ions based on Eqs. (1) and (2) were the same for all organisms in all
ime steps of their life, except for a few individuals who utilized all
hree additive components in Eq. (2) when evaluating fear during
redator attacks (Andersen, 2014). Thus, except in very complex
odel environments, Eq. (1) will do the job.
Each neuronal response R has an additive effect on one neuro-
iological state (Fig. 1).
unger = M × (RAstomach + RAfood ) (3)
ear = (1 − M)  × (RAlight + RApredators + RAconspecifics ) (4)
The subscript A indicates that the neuronal response is used in
he appraisal phase (Fig. 1, top). The modulatory mechanism (M)  is
n this example (Giske et al., 2013) a life-history trade-off between
rowth and survival that may  vary with the developmental state of
he organism. In the model, four genes give the M values at four
ifferent body masses (with other values for M found by linear
nterpolation between these points). The global organismic state
GOS) of the individual is then determined by the stronger of the
eurobiological states of hunger and fear in this case.
The response phase depends on the global organismic state,
here attention narrows the behavioural response to one adequate
or the situation (Fig. 1). In the case of habitat selection for a pelagic
lanktivore, the organism could choose to move up or down in the
ater column or to stay at its current location. The surrounding
epths (z) are evaluated by new neuronal responses and the ﬁsh
oves to the depth that maximizes net neuronal response (Fig. 1,
ottom). For hungry ﬁsh (Eq. (5)) the response from seeing food
ives a positive effect while the response from seeing conspeciﬁcs
as a negative effect. For frightened ﬁsh (Eq. (6)) the response
rom conspeciﬁcs have a positive effect while light have a nega-
ive effect, since risk is strongly linked to light intensity in pelagic
nvironments, which decays fast with depth (Giske et al., 1994):
ungry fish : maxz−1,z,z+1(RHfood − RHconspecifics ) (5)
rightened fish : maxz−1,z,z+1(RFconspecifics − RFlight ) (6)
Each individual had 23 genes (9 x- and 9 y-genes, 4 M genes
nd one sex-determination gene) that determined response func-
ions and modulatory mechanism. Evolving in a genetic algorithm,
t took a few thousand generations to ﬁnd quasi-stable solutions.
uch of the adaptive evolution was done within the ﬁrst couple
f generations, and most was done in the ﬁrst hundred. The long
ail in slower improvement is due to the weaker selection gradient
ear the optimum (Fisher, 1930), plus undulations in the ﬁtness
andscape caused by density-dependent growth and survival and
requency-dependent selection (Giske et al., 2013).
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